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Congress’s sexual assault proposals are the latest development
in a long history of civilian intervention in military justice.
Earlier this year, the Military Justice Improvement Act was introduced into Congress with the aim
of removing sexual assault cases from the chain of command. While some commentators have
expressed their concern at the potential for the Act to reduce the authority of military
commanders, and thus their effectiveness, others argue that the best way for the military to
operate is with a degree of civilian control. Looking at the long history of congressional and
executive interference into the military’s internal affairs, Brian Forester, Rachel Sondheimer,
and Rachel Yon write that the current debate raises broader questions about the military’s
autonomy versus society’s values.
In May, the Department of Defense released an annual report documenting 3,374 reported cases
of sexual assault in the previous year (a 6 percent increase from the last report) with just 302
going to trial, and a total of 238 convictions. Another DoD report released in the spring estimated
that 26,000 active duty members of the military (more than 6 percent) had “experienced some
form of unwanted sexual contact” in the year leading up to the survey. These numbers add to the
increasing salience of the problem of sexual assault in the military raised elsewhere by the award-
winning documentary The Invisible War and high profile incidents including an Army sergeant,
serving as a sexual assault prevention and response coordinator, coming under investigation for
abusive sexual contact and assault and a non-commissioned officer at the United States Military
Academy filming unsuspecting female cadets in the shower.
The Military Justice Improvement Act  (MJIA), offered by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) as an
amendment to the annual military spending bill, is one of a handful of Congressional proposals to
alter how the Department of Defense handles claims of sexual assault. Senator Gillibrand’s bill removes sexual
assault cases from the chain of command, giving military prosecutors, rather than the accusers’ commanders, the
ability to decide whether or not to the try cases.  An alternative measure is being offered by Senator Claire
McCaskill (D-MO) and is supported by the Department of Defense.  This measure would keep court-martial
proceedings within the chain of command but would remove commanders’ ability to overturn jury verdicts.
There is some consternation
about Congress inserting itself
into the military’s internal affairs
but there is a rich history of
congressional and executive
branch involvement in the military
justice system. During and
following World War II, the US
military received a great deal of
criticism surrounding the court-
martial system (the Army, the
Navy, and the Coast Guard each
followed independent sets of
internal disciplinary laws to deal
with members’ offenses). The
push for reform was concurrent to
the creation of the Department of
Defense and one of its main
stated goals was the unification
of the services.  With this in
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mind, the Senate Armed Services Committee demanded that the new Secretary of Defense submit a Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for congressional review.
The UCMJ requires the Commander-in-Chief‘s implementation, which he does via an executive order. He has
repeatedly used executive orders to make changes to the UCMJ and the manner in which it is implemented. The
UCMJ has also been altered by a number of congressional amendments.  The Military Justice Act of 1968  brought
the due process rights of members of the armed services closer to those enjoyed by civilians in criminal court. The
Military Justice Act of 1983  made procedural changes, including the ability to appeal certain cases from the U.S.
Court of Military Appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court. Finally, Congress has recently taken to using the National
Defense Authorization Act to amend the UCMJ each fiscal year.
Amendments to the UCMJ have been made in order to increase and improve the due process and procedural
rights of defendants in these cases. To date, neither Congress nor the President has fundamentally interfered with
the hierarchical structure in which the military deals with these cases or the commanders’ role in the military justice
system.  As such, while civilians traditionally tinker with the legal process, they rarely, if ever, alter the military’s
execution of the system. Given the relative autonomy of military commanders under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the debate over the MJIA highlights broader questions of civilian control of the military. Is congressional
intervention in this traditionally militarily autonomous sphere warranted? Should Congress intervene and
significantly alter the long-held UCMJ authority of military commanders?
Opponents of the MJIA ground
their argument in the assumption
that removing military
commanders’ authority will harm
military effectiveness. The idea
that safeguarding the military’s
professional autonomy is the best
way to both maximize its
effectiveness and ensure civilian
control is typified in the writings of
political scientist Samuel
Huntington, whose model of
“objective control” provides
distinct military and civilian
spheres of operation. By
Huntington’s account, increased
civilian meddling in the military
sphere erodes military
professionalism, thus reducing its
functional effectiveness as an
organization.  This sentiment is prominently reflected in the views of opponents to the Military Justice Improvement
Act, such as former congressman Allen West, who argues that such congressional interference will “break down
the good order and discipline of the United States military.” Additionally, MJIA critic Mackubin Thomas Owens links
the proposed legislation to a broader “feminist assault” on the culture of the U.S. military, which would diminish its
effectiveness. Owens’ argument implies that military culture is necessarily more masculine than mainstream
American society, and that its alteration would undermine military effectiveness.
While Huntington’s ideal conception of civil-military relations encourages the separation of the military from the
civilian sphere, the opposing construct – articulated by sociologist Morris Janowitz – argues that civilian
penetration of military culture is the best way to maintain control. Believing that the sexual assault problem is due
to pernicious aspects of a masculine military culture, MJIA advocates reject the notion that military commanders
alone can effectively address problems of sexual assault, suggesting that military commanders’ autonomy actually
breeds a conflict of interest. The Center for American Progress reports that “since military commanders are
evaluated on their command climate and are rated poorly if sexual assault takes place within their unit, it is not in
a commander’s best interest to even investigate allegations.” Therefore, according to MJIA advocates, civilian
leaders in Congress have a responsibility to intervene and alter the procedures administering such cases.
Huntington and Janowitz’ approaches offer significant theoretical leverage toward understanding the debate over
the MJIA and other similar efforts. Moreover, the MJIA is one among several other contemporary issues with
similar civil-military implications, such as the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” and the integration of women into
combat roles. Further analysis of these issues through the civil-military framework provides fresh insight as the
U.S. considers how to balance military effectiveness with the need for its military to represent the values of the
society it serves.
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